Alternative Military Strategies for the Future by Keith A Dunn

Author:Keith A Dunn [Dunn, Keith A]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367155148
Google: hqzwygEACAAJ
Goodreads: 48633590
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2020-12-07T00:00:00+00:00

None of these values can be taken as definitive. Factors of troop quality, leadership, terrain, and terrain preparation would all figure in determining the exchange rate of an actual battle. Nevertheless, consistent with the view that Soviet doctrine is superior to our own and the view that offense is somehow a "better" posture than defense implicit in that doctrine, a relatively gentle 1.5:1 exchange rate is imposed on the Soviets in the "Soviet" case. This still assumes some advantage for the tactical defender, although not very much.

The "NATO" case assumes a slightly more favorable exchange rate, 2:1. This is still a good deal less than the Israelis enjoyed in 1973 and a good deal less than many professional estimates.

Movement Rates. Movement rates during breakthrough operations have also not received a thorough public discussion, although one analyst has compared historical advance rates with those found in published Soviet writing. Perhaps the most definitive thing that can be gleaned from a quick historical survey is that sustained advances of fifteen-twenty km per day are possible against a disorganized, erratic, and uncoordinated defense.38 This estimate, however, is in sharp contrast to the 100 km or more per day found in some Soviet literature. Since the Attrition-FEBA-Expansion Model tests NATO's ability to prevent breakthroughs during stressful assaults, the question is what is a reasonable rate of advance for a determined breakthrough effort?

Jeffrey Record notes that during the breakthrough battle at Sedan in 1940, it took the German XIX Panzer Corps (1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer divisions) some four days to crack the French defense line near Sedan for an average daily advance of about six km per day. The "Soviet" case assumes a five km daily rate of advance. Such an assumption would be consistent with the hypothesis that a NATO-Pact quantitative and qualitative gap similar to that which existed between the best-armed and best-trained, mechanized formations of the German Army, and a mixed bag of largely unmechanized, active and reserve, French infantry divisions will prevail in the breakthrough sectors. This would seem a pessimistic assessment of the quality and quantity of NATO's military forces.

The "NATO" case makes movement rate assumptions more consistent with the tougher defensive actions of World War II. US First and Ninth Armies' efforts to reach the Roer River, after the Siegfried Line had been partially breached, may be taken as representative of such actions. The area opposite the Ninth Army's XIX Corps was rolling, open country, dotted with small villages. The Germans had taken three weeks to prepare the area with earthworks and belts of mines. This sector would be similar to the more topographically attractive breakthrough sectors along the inter-German border. Since the "Soviet" case assumes that at least a month is required for the Pact to train and move forward the Category II divisions needed to support a big attack, NATO would have as much time to prepare the terrain for defense as the Germans did. Although the Allies enjoyed complete air superiority, reasonably good (though not

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